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Abstract—The uniqueness, complexity, and diversity of facial
shapes and expressions led to success of facial biometric
systems. Regardless of the accuracy of current facial recognition
methods, most of them are vulnerable against the presentation
of sophisticated masks. In the highly monitored application
scenario at airports and banks, fraudsters probably do not wear
masks. However, a deception will become more probable due to
the increase of unsupervised authentication using kiosks, eGates
and mobile phones in self-service. To robustly detect elastic 3D
masks, one of the ultimate goals is to automatically analyze
the plausibility of the facial behavior based on a sequence of
3D face scans. Most importantly, such a method would also
detect all less advanced presentation attacks using static 3D
masks, bent photographs with eyeholes, and replay attacks
using monitors. Our proposed method achieves this goal by
comparing the temporal curvature change between presentation
attacks and genuine faces. For evaluation purposes, we recorded
a challenging database containing replay attacks, static and
elastic 3D masks using a high-quality 3D sensor. Based on the
proposed representation, we found a clear separation between
the low facial expressiveness of presentation attacks and the
plausible behavior of genuine faces.
I. INTRODUCTION
The digitalization of organizational processes to improve
their efficiency in terms of time and resources is progressing
extremely fast. The demand for robust, unsupervised authen-
tication methods is getting equally stronger. However, current
authentication methods are not able to detect advanced spoof-
ing attacks or identity thefts. Organizational processes which
should be robust against fraud are for example automated
border control, the opening of a bank account, financial
transfer, and mobile payments using self-service eGates,
kiosks, and mobile phones. In the following, a presentation
attack refers to all cases in which biometric copies are
presented.
Biometric methods focus on the shape of the human
body as physiological characteristics of e.g. the finger-, palm
print, and the iris [31]. The promising field of behavioral
biometrics contains the analysis of e.g. the voice [8], walking
gait [7] and keystroke dynamics [22]. By definition, these
methods are more robust against presentation attacks than
biometric methods that rely on static appearance. However,
individual characteristics can be either replayed or imitated
by another person [1]. Instead of developing an even more
robust behavioral biometric method, we focus on the task of
Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) as a mandatory security
check for face authentication systems.
The authors acknowledge the financial support by the Federal Ministry of
Education and Research of Germany in the framework of 3D-Finder (project
number 03ZZ0445G).
We analyze the plausibility of the individual facial trait
of a person based on temporal sequences of 3D face scans
which we call 4D face scans. At first, we apply an un-
supervised preprocessing step for face extraction and pose
normalization. Afterward, we account for the huge amount
of redundant information in high-resolution 4D face scans by
analyzing the plausibility of curvature changes at subsampled
radial stripes. Both handcrafted steps are appropriate in this
case since it is not possible to create a large and unbiased
database with all different presentation attacks to perform
classification using e.g. deep learning.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Presentation Attack Detection
Similarly to the production of counterfeit money, im-
posters of an authentication system will always try to create
better biometric copies. Most current 2D face authentication
methods can be attacked by presenting photographs and
3D masks of another person’s face [3]. Therefore, several
methods like [17] exist for distinguishing an image of a
face photograph from an image of a genuine face. Since
these methods are not able to detect attacks using high-
quality photographs, challenge-response authentication meth-
ods were developed. For authentication, a user is asked to
read words aloud [19], move its head [10], blink its eyes [28],
or show facial expressions. However, these methods can be
attacked by presenting a video on a monitor where the face
behaves the same way as so-called replay attacks. Again, a
solution to detect these attacks is to analyze if the 3D facial
structure is plausible based on 3D landmark locations [30]
or the mean curvature [20]. Such methods are robust against
the presentation of bent photographs, but can still be attacked
using 3D masks [26]. Even the 3D facial recognition system
Face ID [25] analyzes only the static facial appearance in
3D to planar presentation attacks. To detect even elastic 3D
masks, we have developed a method that combines both, the
temporal analysis of 3D face scans and a challenge-response
protocol.
Recent deep learning methods [23] can detect many kinds
of 3D masks from 2D color videos of subjects with a neutral
facial expression. They do not take the depth information into
account and focus on subconscious facial movements like
blinking. Hence, they are still vulnerable to replay attacks
and unseen or partial 3D masks. Deep learning methods for
PAD based on sequences of 2.5D depth images [14] are
also able to detect 3D masks. Even though they achieve
impressive results, their training databases are biased due to a
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few different masks and genuine faces. Even if a challenging
training database containing all state-of-the-art mask types
would be available, a novel mask type or adversarial example
[27] could still be used to attack the system. Thus, these
methods are also not robust against unseen presentation
attacks. Furthermore, these methods are not invariant under
Euclidean transformations as they do not directly extract
features from the 3D facial surface. In contrast, our method
requires no costly training on such biased databases and only
obtains the lower limit of the plausible amount of facial
expression changes from recordings of genuine faces.
Liveness detection methods analyze the differences be-
tween genuine facial skin and masks or partial face mod-
ifications. One example of such a method is the estimation
of the heart pulse rate from a regular camera [21]. However,
emitting a green flashing light onto a mask with a plausible
frequency can fool these methods since the light green
channel varies the most with the pulse [9]. Furthermore,
these methods can be attacked by presenting thin/partial
masks and require almost static facial expression, pose, and
illumination.
Alternatively, presentation attacks could be detected as all
cases where the resulting shape and expression parameters
of a fitted 3D morphable model (3DMM) [4] exceed their
expected range. However, 3DMMs cannot adapt to 3D scans
of photographs/monitors and would result in underfitting.
Thus, the shape and expression parameters would still remain
in the plausible range of genuine faces because of their
inherent, statistical bounds of all faces during training.
B. Curvature Analysis of Radial Stripes
As emphasized by Katina et al. [15], 3D anatomical
curves provide a much richer characterization of faces than
landmarks, which are just individual points along anatomical
curves. The method from Vittert et al. [29] localizes a com-
plete set of anatomical curves along ridges and valleys of the
facial shape. The overall curvature along a curve is iteratively
maximized over points with a positive or negative shape
index, respectively. A complete facial model is built from
these anatomical curves, subsampled intermediate curves,
and manually annotated landmarks. However, it was applied
for statistics of the neutral face appearance. In the case of
facial expressions, the shape index and 1D curvature can
change drastically and would require many heuristics to still
obtain robust anatomical curves.
Instead of relying on anatomical curves, the representation
form Berretti et al. [2] approximates the facial shape with
a set of geodesics. A set of radial curves is created by
intersecting the facial surface with planes through the nose
tip. Starting with the anatomical midsaggital plane, it is
repeatedly rotated around the roll axis by a fraction of the
full angle. This representation has proven to result in superior
performances in 4D facial expression recognition [33], face
recognition [12], and even body part analysis in general [5].
However, the method from Zhen et al. [33] would have a
too high computational effort, if applied to facial behavior
analysis on high-quality 4D scans due to the costly alignment
procedure. All consecutive face scans are roughly aligned
using the iterative closest point algorithm, following a fine-
alignment of all consecutive radial curves using dynamic
programming.
For feature extraction, all mentioned methods rely on the
first derivative or curvature of curves along the surface w.r.t.
arc-length. Instead, we encourage to use the 3D surface
curvature [24] which takes the neighborhood on a 2D surface
into account and is more robust against overfitting through
noise, outliers, and holes. For registration purposes, the
mentioned methods fit 1D curves and enforce a homogeneous
geodesic distance by equidistant sampling along the arc-
length. However, it is assumed that the complexity of the
underlying surface must be similar for all curves and all
expected shapes as the degrees of freedom of the curves are
fixed to a certain number. Due to the huge shape variety
of faces, 3D masks, and planar presentation attacks, this is
not given in case of presentation attacks. Curves along the
nasal ridge and through the cheeks have a lower curvature
than curves through the eyes and mouth. In the extreme case
of presentation attacks using photographs and monitors, all
curvature values should be small. Depending on whether the
degrees of freedom are adjusted to more or less complex
surfaces, it results in over- or underfitting in the other cases,
respectively.
III. METHODOLOGY
The calculation of our representation is illustrated in the
pipeline in Fig. 1. Given two synchronized sequences of color
and depth images, two preprocessing steps are performed.
First, the anatomical landmarks are localized in the color im-
ages, transformed to the depth images and 3D reconstructed
(Section III-A.1). Second, the face is extracted and the pose
is normalized for each frame, to obtain a local coordinate
system which is centered at the nose tip (Section III-A.2).
Afterward, we are proposing a representation of 4D face
scans based on the following two steps: Equidistant surface
curvatures are extracted at equiangular radial stripes to
subsample the point cloud (Section III-B.1). The curvatures
of consecutive frames are correlated over time to locally
measure the curvature change for each radial stripe (Sec-
tion III-B.2). The graph in Fig. 1 shows the maximum cross-
correlation for each radial stripe over time. For example, the
temporal changes of the two inner peaks relate to the eye
movements and the two outer peaks to the mouth movements.
We found that the standard deviation of the temporal changes
in the mouth region allows for PAD (Section IV-A).
A. Preprocessing Steps
1) 3D Landmark Localization: The starting point for
many methods which analyze human faces is the extraction
of anthropometrical landmarks around the eyebrows, eyes,
mouth, and nose (see Fig. 1, left). Since 2D facial landmark
localization methods usually achieve superior performances
than 3D methods due to larger training databases, we use the
method from Kazemi et al. [16]. The even higher robustness
of more recent deep learning methods [6] is not required as
radial stripe 3D curvature pose
3D
calculation normalization
reconstruction
extraction
cross-correlation
temporal
transformation
landmark
face and landmark localization
images
frame
color
images
frame
depth
temporal curvature analysis
Fig. 1: Our suggested representation of 4D face scans reduces the huge amount of biometric characteristics in color and depth image sequences to the
graph shown on the right. This graph measures the facial expression change at certain radial stripes over time.
we are focusing on the cooperative self-service scenario with
an almost frontal pose and little occlusion.
For stereoscopic and multi-view camera systems, the 2D
landmarks can be 3D reconstructed using the registered depth
image. However, in case of denser and more accurate 3D
scans of a structured-light 3D sensor, the depth and color
images are not registered. In this case, texture coordinates
contain the pixel-wise mappings from the depth image to
the color image. We store the inverse mapping from color to
depth pixels during the calculation of the texture coordinates
and call them depth coordinates. Finally, the closest non-
zero depth coordinate for a given color coordinate points
to its corresponding depth. Since the texture coordinates
are always calculated, the computational overhead of this
approach is negligible. Fig. 1 shows the corresponding land-
mark locations in the color and depth image.
Alternatively, 3D landmarks could be 3D reconstructed
using lossy RGB-D images in two ways. First, a registered
depth image can be created by extracting the color values
for each pixel in the depth image using texture coordinates.
Second, a depth value can be assigned to each color pixel
after 3D reconstructing and projecting all depth pixels to
the color camera. As the resolution of the depth images is
usually smaller than of the color images, the first approach
would result in low-resolution color images and the second
approach would result in depth images with holes. Further-
more, our approach avoids the high computational demand
of both common alternatives.
2) Face Extraction and Pose Normalization: In the appli-
cation scenario of a static 3D sensor in an eGate or kiosk
system, the field of view must be large enough to capture
faces of people with different sizes and positions. As such
3D face scans mostly contain background, the preprocessing
first step centers the point cloud at the nose tip landmark and
extracts all points inside a sphere with r = 0.1m.
The second preprocessing step normalizes the head pose
to an upright and frontal view. For head pose estimation, we
adopt the approach from Derkach et al. [11] based on facial
landmarks (see Fig. 2). Finally, the corresponding transposed
rotation matrix is applied for pose normalization. This allows
Fig. 2: Left: According to [15], anthropometric landmarks are located at
positions of maximum curvature along ridges and ruts of the facial surface
and where these anatomical curves intersect (image from Klare and Jain
[18] c© 2010, IEEE). Right: The red landmarks are used for estimating the
roll angle (red arrow) of the head pose. A plane is fitted onto the red and
blue landmarks and the x- and y-components of its normal vector (green) are
used for estimating the yaw and pitch angles. For visualization purposes,
a triangulated mesh is shown instead of the point cloud (best viewed in
color).
us to also achieve robust results in case of deviations of the
head pose from the frontal view.
B. Spatiotemporal Curvature Analysis
The most important subtask of a method for 4D facial
behavior analysis is to deal with the extremely high spa-
tiotemporal redundancy of the 4D face scans. The temporal
difference between consecutive face scans and the spatial
difference between points and its immediate neighbors are
very small. Thus, a feature representation should only extract
facial expression changes, which constitute the overall facial
behavior. Our new representation achieves this goal by
calculating the curvature of point subsets in Section III-B.2
and a correlation-based approach in Section III-B.2.
1) Curvature Analysis of Radial Stripes: After applying
the preprocessing steps, we account for the common issue of
holes and peaks in 3D scans by calculating the mean depth
image between three consecutive 3D scans. To extract radial
stripes in the next step, a reference coordinate system given
by the three unit vectors n1...3 in x-, y-, and z-direction is
Fig. 3: After normalizing the pose to an upright and frontal view, we extract
a radial stripe through the face (left). We then rotate the plane repeatedly by
a fraction of the full angle until we obtained N radial stripes (right, after
4 rotations).
Fig. 4: Due to overfitting of radial curves, the 1D curvature becomes
large (middle) in case of noisy, planar 3D scans of monitors (left) and
photographs. Instead, the 3D surface curvature (right) is more robust against
noise and is almost zero everywhere in this case.
centered at the nose tip landmark. First, we intersect the
face with the yz-plane as shown in Fig. 3 (exemplary, w/o
cropping). A radial stripe is then extracted by taking all
points for which the projection onto the x-axis n1 is lower
than a certain threshold δ and the projection onto the y-axis
n2 is positive aspi =
xiyi
zi
 : ∣∣pTi n1∣∣ ≤ δ;pTi n2 > 0
 (1)
among all points pi of a single 3D face scan. Afterward, the
x- and y-axis are rotated around the z-axis by α = 360
◦
N and
the process is repeated until N radial stripes are extracted.
To reduce the feature dimension, we calculate the curva-
ture for each sampled point based on its local neighborhood
in the original point cloud. The usage of the curvature
is encouraged by its invariance under 3D Euclidean trans-
formations. The curvature can be calculated from the 1D
parametric arc-length representation of each curve as
κ(s) =
y′′
(1 + y′2)
3
2
. (2)
However, the resulting 1D curvatures in case of a 3D scan of
a flat surface in Fig. 4 are in the range of the curvatures of
genuine face scans due to overfitting to the noisy point cloud.
As a consequence, we are approximating the 3D surface
Fig. 5: The 3D curvature of the face is large in the important facial areas of
eyes, eyebrows, and the mouth. The first radial stripe (black) is vertically
aligned and points downward.
curvature [24] as the surface variation from the statistics
of the neighborhood for each point as
κ˜(i) =
∣∣∣∣ λ0λ0 + λ1 + λ2
∣∣∣∣ , (3)
where λ0 < λ1 < λ2 and λi are the eigenvalues of a
principal component analysis applied to a local point subset.
In Fig. 5, it is shown that this approach is more robust
against overfitting as a larger neighborhood on a 2D surface
is taken into account. This approximation also avoids the
major impact of the unbounded, unstable second derivation
in (2). The surface variation is bounded to 13 for isotropically
distributed points.
To compare consecutive radial stripes, we subsample M
points along each radial stripe. We obtain an equidistant
spacing between each point by sampling along the projection
to the y-axis pTi ni. An important advantage of the resulting
representation is, that the degree of linear and angular
subsampling can be varied depending on the desired accuracy
and runtime.
2) Measuring the Facial Expression Change: The result-
ing curvatures of genuine faces would still be indistinguish-
able from well-shaped copies like the 3D masks from REAL-
f Co. Therefore, we measure the temporal curvature change
between consecutive face scans and perform PAD on the
resulting time series representation.
After extracting the curvature of M points along N
radial stripes, the point-wise product of the curvature values
between consecutive radial stripes is calculated. Since the
detected position of the nose tip varies slightly, it is necessary
to align the radial stripes to each other. This is done by
taking the corresponding shift at the point of maximum cross-
correlation
Rt = max
j
(
M∑
i=−M
κ˜t(i) · κ˜t−1(i+ j)
)
(4)
between consecutive radial stripes at time steps t and t− 1.
The maximum cross-correlation measures how similar the
consecutive curvature values are. The resulting multivariate
Fig. 6: Our new database contains 4D scans of presentation attacks using
monitors (top middle/right), static 3D mask (bottom left) and elastic 3D
masks (bottom right). The implemented challenge-response protocol results
in the first database which allows for detecting presentation attacks using
3D behavioral analysis.
time series containing the values of Rt for each radial stripe
measures the individual change of the facial expression.
To compare the amount of change between presentation
attacks and genuine faces, we calculate the standard deviation
of each time series. The standard deviation measures the
overall facial expression intensity and is comparable between
all recordings if the number of facial expressions is similar.
For PAD, all subjects were asked to answer the same
number of questions to make the number of induced facial
expressions and visemes1 comparable.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. 4D Presentation Attack Detection
Many published databases for PAD contain at most only
2D presentation attacks using bent photographs with holes
[32]. The recently published 3D-MAD [13], CS-MAD [3]
and WMCA [14] databases also contain static, elastic and
partial 3D masks as presentation attacks. However, they were
recorded using a low-quality 3D sensor and capture only the
neutral face appearance without any facial expression. Since
our method analyzes facial behavior, it is not possible to
apply it to these databases.
Therefore, we collected an own database containing 48
4D face scans of 16 subjects and 9 presentation attacks
using replay attacks, static and elastic 3D masks (see Fig. 6).
Furthermore, some subjects have beards, wear classes and
make-up to make it more challenging as these cases can only
be reconstructed very inaccurately using active 3D sensors.
We used a structured-light 3D sensor with a high accuracy
of σ = 100µm and a depth resolution of 1 MP at 30Hz
over a duration of 18 s (540 frames). For each face scan,
the computation takes only 162 ms on a Core-i7 CPU and
the number of extracted points is around 100000. We will
publish the source code and our new database.
In general, challenge-response protocols are used in case
of recent behavioral biometric or PAD methods to become
1In general, visemes contain all mouth appearances during speech.
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Fig. 7: For most recordings of genuine faces like an average one with
number 22, the facial expression change is much larger than in case of the
3D mask recording with number 7. Even though the facial expression change
is similar in some cases like number 11 (elastic 3D mask) and number 5
(minimal facial expression), there is still a large difference concerning the
standard deviation.
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Fig. 8: The blue and orange curves show the sample distribution of σ(Rt)
for each radial stripes and N = 128. Some standard deviations are small
for both presentation attacks and genuine faces, but the radial stripes which
correspond to the mouth and eye regions show substantial differences.
robust against static presentation attacks. We adopted the
common practice of asking familiar small-talk questions
at a bank or concerning the entry regulations in cross-
border traffic. We instructed the user to answer by speaking,
to induct visemes and facial expressions. In our case, the
captured face scans serve as the response and are analyzed
for irregularities in facial appearance and expression.
After calculating Rt for all radial stripes and time series
using (4), we found that the overall facial expression change
of genuine faces is much larger than of presentation attacks
(see Fig. 7). Fig. 8 shows the distribution of σ(Rt) among
all radial stripes and recordings. The standard deviation of
the first and last few radial stripes through the mouth differ
between genuine faces and presentation attacks by a large
margin. For the eye regions, the standard deviation is also
different, but not well-separated. Active 3D sensors are not
able to accurately measure the eye region which is either
reflecting or absorbing the projected stripe pattern. As shown
in Fig. 9, a single radial stripe through the mouth region
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Fig. 9: We used the radial stripe which comprises the maximum overall
curvature around the mouth region for PAD. A threshold at the lower limit
of the plausible amount of facial expression change allows finally to separate
genuine faces from presentation attacks.
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Fig. 10: As a baseline, we calculated the standard deviation of the mouth
openings in y- and z-direction over time as a simple measurement of the
facial expression intensity. Even though the standard deviation is also larger
in case of genuine faces, both classes are not well separated.
is finally sufficient to perfectly classify between genuine
faces and presentation attacks. A threshold of 0.4 also leaves
enough space for even more elastic 3D masks.
The key idea behind our approach is that presentation
attacks show less facial expressions compared to genuine
faces concerning the standard deviation of our representation.
Hence, it would also be possible to track the position of
any patch of the facial surface, extract local features and
measure their standard deviation. Since it is not trivial to
select a suited surface patch and to track its position in case
of facial expressions and pose changes, we implemented a
similar method based on the mouth openings as a baseline.
After pose normalization, the Euclidean y- and z-distances
between the labrale superior (ls) and labrale inferior (li) 3D
landmarks are calculated as the mouth openings. However,
the resulting standard deviations of these time series in
Fig. 10 are too similar between genuine faces and elastic
3D masks.
For comparison purposes, we implemented the simple, yet
powerful method from Lagorio et al. [20]. They found that
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Fig. 11: The mean curvature of the four rightmost presentation attacks using
monitors is smaller than the mean curvature of genuine faces. However, this
representation does not allow distinguishing between 3D masks and genuine
faces.
the mean 3D surface curvature of genuine 3D face scans
is larger than the mean curvature of (bent) photographs. To
improve the robustness of this method, we also applied our
preprocessing steps from Section III-A.2. Fig. 11 shows that
this also holds in case of the four rightmost presentation
attacks using monitors. However, since a 3D scan of a
reflecting monitor is noisy, the differences are much smaller
than their stated difference of an order of magnitude between
photographs and genuine faces. As expected, their method
cannot detect the presentation attacks using 3D masks since
their mean curvature is in the same range as for genuine
faces.
B. Paresis Treatment Analysis
In many cases of treatment analyses of patients, the
individual progress matters and is too complex to be deduced
from the average or a similar patient. As an outlook, we also
applied our representation to individual treatment analysis
of a patient with facial paresis. We recorded a patient every
month over one year using the same 3D sensor as before.
At the beginning of the study, the facial nerve of the right
facial half was cut, resulting in a complete paralysis. During
the treatment, the nerve grew back together (reinnervation),
showed first signs of its restored functionality on 09/04/2018
and allowed for substantial, voluntary muscle movements at
the end of the treatment (see Fig. 12).
For each recording, we calculated the mean of the cross-
correlation R¯t over the snarl facial exercise. Fig. 13 shows
that R¯t improved continously over time during the rein-
nervation. The fluctuations on the healthy half of the face
are caused by the varying motivation of the patient. Due to
mass movements, i.e. stretching of the paretic muscles to the
healthy half of the face, R¯t is also high for the paretic half of
the mouth. Since the eyes cannot be accurately reconstructed
with 3D sensors in general, fluctuations of R¯t occur in both
eye regions.
Fig. 12: After one year of home-based training, the facial symmetry of this
patient improved. Especially the nasolabial fold (blue ellipsen) became more
pronounced and the muscles on the right facial half allowed for voluntary
movements.
eye cheek mouth
paretic half
healthy half
cheekmouth eye
Fig. 13: Besides natural fluctuations, R¯t improved over time for the curves
through the left cheek (arrow) and the snarl exercise. Thus, the treatment
method was successful as the nerve reinnervated and allowed for voluntary
muscle movements.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Even though current face authentication methods achieve
impressive accuracies, most methods can be fooled by pre-
senting a facial photograph of someone else instead of their
own face. The ultimate goal for detecting also advances
presentation attacks like bent photographs, replay attacks on
monitors and elastic 3D masks, is to analyze if the behavior
and the 3D shape of a face scan are plausible. To the best
of our knowledge, we developed the first method which
is able to robustly detect all of these presentation attacks
directly based on 4D face scans. We subsampled the 3D
surface curvature at equiangular radial stripes and calculated
the standard deviation of the cross-correlation between con-
secutive stripes over time. Our proposed representation also
allows for varying the degree of subsampling depending on
the desired accuracy and runtime.
Many published databases for PAD contain at most only
2D presentation attacks using bent photographs with holes
or the neutral face appearance in case of 3D presentation
attacks. Since our method focuses on facial behavior, we
collected a challenging database containing three different
types of sophisticated masks and monitor replay-attacks.
To induct facial expressions, we implemented a challenge-
response protocol and asked the user to answer familiar
questions in cross-border traffic by speaking. Our evaluation
results for PAD showed the potential of our representation
as a single radial stripe through the mouth was sufficient to
perfectly distinguish between 2D/3D presentation attacks and
genuine faces. For future work, it remains a difficult task to
distinguish elastic 3D masks from genuine faces which show
minimal facial expressions while speaking.
To show the potential of our representation of 3D face
scans for other research topics, we applied it to individual
treatment analysis of patients with facial paresis. In this case,
multiple radial stripes of our representation were required to
highlight and localize the individual improvement in facial
symmetry.
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